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Abstract
In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by rms that com-
pete à la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits
regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that permits prices may increase after clean
technology adoption. Herein we show that, since strategic rms are able to predict
such increase, this results in a non-innovation equilibrium (even for very low adoption
costs). To the light of the previous result, we nd a su¢ cient condition for the cap on
emissions to ensure positive innovation incentives.
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1 Introduction
Herein we assess the incentives to invest in clean technologies of polluting rms with market
power in their local output market, who participate in a region-wide tradable emissions
permits (TEP) market. Firms compete à la Cournot producing a homogenous good and
emissions as a by-product.1 Due to such emissions, rms are subject to an environmental
regulation that consists in the creation of a number of tradable emission permits that are
then freely allocated to rms by each country regulator. Since permits are tradable, rms
buy/sell permits in order to hold one permit per unit of emissions, at the end of the period.
This description corresponds to the way that sectors subject to international competition
in the European Union (EU) are regulated via the EU-Emission Trading Scheme (ETS): to
comply with the EU-wide CO2 emission reduction objective (8%) established by the Kyoto
Protocol, national allocation plans (NAPs) are established.2 Those NAPs, after the EU
Commissions approval, reect the burden sharing rules decided through negotiation. In
accordance with each NAP, each government allocates permits among rms operating in the
country, permits that can then be traded internationally. Some of the rms receiving permits
have market power in their local market, e.g. electricity utilities, but are price takers in the
region-wide EU-ETS where rms from outside their local market participate. Those rms,
all together, can push up or down the price of permits according to their behavior in the
local output market. In such case, their interaction in the output market may inuence the
outcome in the permits market, even if due to the relative small size of the local output
market in relation to the region-wide emissions market, they do not consider the possibility
of exerting any inuence in the permits market.
Regarding the investment decision, we suppose that rms can choose to produce with
their (dirty) technology or to invest in a clean technology that decreases emissions intensity
of output. Such denition of environmental innovation is inspired by Bréchet and Jouvet
(2008) and it is very appropriate in the case of pollutants with the characteristics of CO2, in
which emission reduction can be best achieved by input substitution or by a more general
change in the production process itself as opposed to investing in end-of-pipe technology.3
We model the choice of technology as follows: in a rst stage, rms choose the production
technology and, in a second stage, they choose output production, and consequently, the
number of permits to buy/sell.4 We focus on the analysis of fullled expectations equilib-
ria5 (FEE) resulting from the game to derive the conditions for having positive innovation
1This can be due to the use of a polluting input or due to a polluting production process itself.
2http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/implementation_en.htm
3Most literature on environmental innovation is concerned with end-of-pipe innovation (see for example
Requate and Unold, 2003), which is not the most commonly used in the case of CO2 reduction.
4This sequence of decisions follows the rule of the less irreversible decision.
5This concept, derived from Katz and Shapiro (1985), will be claried in the following section.
2
incentives. The structure of the model is inspired by the technology-linked-markets setup
proposed by Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2006, 2008) and the innovation game is inspired by
Gabszewicz and Garella (1995) when modelling the decision of internalizing the production
of an intermediate good.
Most of the literature on environmental innovation is devoted to the comparison of the
innovation incentives under alternative pollution control rules. With the exception of Mon-
tero (2002), in general this literature considers the output market as competitive (Parry,
1998 and Requate, 1998). Montero (2002) denes innovation as investing in an R&D sector,
which produces a (proportional) decrease in the separable cost of abatement per unit of
R&D invested. In this context, he studies the impact of strategic interactions in the output
market on innovation incentives when the market for tradable emission permits is cleared
through (Nash) bargaining between two strategic rms. He nds that one rms innovation
decreases permits prices which, on one hand, reduces its production costs (direct e¤ect) but,
on the other hand, increases competition in the output market (strategic e¤ect) due to the
decrease in the rivals production costs. The incentives to innovate then depend on the net
e¤ect. Herein, as in Sanin and Zanaj (2011), the direct e¤ect may be by itself positive or
negative and therefore may add-up to the strategic e¤ect. In this context, we show how
innovation incentives depend on rms position in the permits market, on the rate of region-
wide innovation and on output strategic interaction in the local markets, which in turn are
a function of the constraint imposed by the cap. In particular, the cap on emissions will be
more or less restrictive depending on the elasticity of output demand and, together with the
increase on emissions e¢ ciency due to the new technology, will determine whether the price
of permits increases or not after innovation (Sanin and Zanaj, 2011). This last e¤ect will
benet sellers or buyers, determining whether an innovation equilibrium arises or not. To
the light of the previous result, we nd a condition for the cap on emissions considered in
each NAP to ensure positive innovation incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the assumptions and solve
the sequential game played by the rms. In Section 3 we analyze equilibria and discuss the
importance of the cap on emissions to induce an innovation equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Inspired by the organization of the EU-ETS, we assume that there are n identical countries
subject to a region-wide cap on emissions nS. All countries are assumed to be identical: each
country, according to its NAP, allocates an amount S of permits for free to rms operating
in its local market. Assume there are two strategic rms producing a homogenous good in
each local market and that the production of the good generates emissions as a by-product.
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A percentage  of S is allocated to rm i and a percentage (1   ) is allocated to rm
j. These percentages are common knowledge. If permits received are not enough (or more
than enough) to produce optimal output, rms trade in the market for permits (locally or
regionally).
We assume that rms play a Cournot game in the local output market producing good y.
Their technology is given by
y = KlE; l = i; j (1)
where E stands for emissions (or use of permits) and Kl is rms l productivity of emissions.
Without innovation, emissions productivity is Kl = 1; l = i; j:6 Firms can choose to imple-
ment a clean technology, i.e. a technology that would increase emissions productivity to K;
with 2  K > 1; paying a xed cost F .7
The choice of technology is modelled as a two-stages game: in the rst stage rms simul-
taneously choose their production technology given their expectations regarding the level of
adoption in the region (and consequently their expected price of permits qe). Such choice
is done by comparing their prots in the output market and in the permits market when
using the clean technology (after paying the xed cost of implementation F ) as opposed to
using the dirty technology. In the second stage rms choose how much to produce y and
trade permits to maximize prots. We nd the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE)
that are fullled expectations equilibria using backward induction. In our setup, a fullled
expectation equilibrium is a permit market equilibrium (and the corresponding output mar-
ket solution) in which the expectations of rms about the permit price are accomplished at
the equilibrium of the game. As in Katz and Shapiro (1985), we nd the conditions for an
innovation (non-innovation or partial adoption) equilibrium to arise in a local market when
rms expect a region-wide innovation (non-innovation or partial adoption) equilibrium and
its corresponding permits price.8
2.1 Second stage: Cournot-Nash production game
Given the technology choice done in the previous stage and linear output demand, prots of
rms are
i(Ki; Kj; q
e) = (1 KiEi  KjEj)KiEi   qe(Ei   S); (2)
j(Ki; Kj; q
e) = (1 KiEi  KjEj)KjEj   qe(Ej   (1  )S): (3)
6We could think of a relationship between the amount of input x used for production and emissions E of
the type E = 1kx: Solving for x; we would obtain the technological relation between emissions and output
in (1).
7We shall restrict 1  K  2 to ensures the existence of equilibrium in the permits market by yielding
positively sloped supply of permits.
8Nonetheless, we analyse the sets of parameters where a FEE does not exist in Appendix B.
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where Ki; Kj 2 f1; Kg ; 1  K  2;  2 (0; 12) and where qe is the expected permits price.
After computing the rst order conditions (FOCs) and solving the system of equations
we nd the optimal use of permits
Ei(Ki; Kj; q
e) = qe
Ki   2Kj
3K2iKj
+
1
3Ki
; (4)
Ej(Ki; Kj; q
e) = qe
Kj   2Ki
3KiK2j
+
1
3Kj
: (5)
The corresponding prots are
i (Ki; Kj; q
e) =
qe(KiKj(2Ki 4Kj 4qe+9SKiKj)+qe(K2i +4K2j ))+K2iK2j
9K2jK
2
i
;
j (Ki; Kj; q
e) =
qe(KiKj(2Kj 4Ki 4qe+9SKiKj(1 ))+qe(K2j+4K2i ))+K2iK2j
9K2jK
2
i
:
(6)
2.2 First stage: technology adoption game
Herein we derive the Nash equilibria in the technology adoption game for given expectations
on other rmsadoption and consequently on qe:
No rm adopts if and only if (i¤) F  l (K; 1; qe)   l (1; 1; qe)  F0(qe),l = i; j; both
rms adopt i¤ F  l (K;K; qe)   l (1; K; qe)  F2(qe); l = i; j; and only one rm adopts
i¤ F2(qe)  F  F0(qe); with
F0(q
e) = 4(q
e K)(1 K)qe
9K2
;
F2(q
e) = 4(1 K)q
e(qe qeK K+qeK)
9K2
:
(7)
Each rm participates in the market for permits as a buyer or a seller depending on the
di¤erence between their needs of permits for production, summarized in (4) and (5), and
the endowment of permits they received for free, S or (1   )S; respectively in each of
the n local markets. Since we consider that all local markets in the region are identical,
the previous implies that total supply (or demand) of permits is n

S   (qeKi 2qeKj+KiKj)
3K2iKj

while region-wide demand (or supply) is n

(qeKj 2qeKi+KiKj)
3KiK2j
  (1  )S

. The demand and
supply of permits come from many industries and these industries are assumed to be of the
same numerosity.
Equalizing demand with supply in the market for permits yields the price of permits
q2 =
1
2
K (2  3KS) ;
q1 =
1
2
K(3SK K 1)
K K2 1 ;
q0 =
(2 3S)
2
:
(8)
q2 if the two rms innovate in each local market, q

1 if one rm innovates in each local
market and q0 if none of them innovate: All permits price are positive if KS  23 : Sub-
stituting the above expressions for permit prices in (4) and (5), one obtains the levels of
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emissions in all outcomes of the game, namely (Ei (q

2); E

j (q

2)); (E

l (q

1); E

 l(q

1)); l = i; j,
and
 
Ei (q

0); E

j (q

0)

:
It is easy to see that equilibrium emissionslevels are always positive in the symmetric
outcomes, whereas the asymmetric outcome of the game is only dened forKS 2  K 1
2K 1 ;
2
3
	
:
It is shown in Appendix A that in the previous set of parameters, prots are positive in all
the outcomes of the game. Thus, our game is dened when
1  K  2 and KS 2

K   1
2K   1;
2
3

: (9)
Most literature on environmental innovation nds that, after implementing a clean technol-
ogy, the price of permits decreases even when considering a non-competitive setting (see
Montero, 2000). Here, as in Sanin and Zanaj (2011), the price of permits after innovation
q1 may be higher or lower than the price without innovation. In particular, it will be higher
than q1 when the pair fS;Kg is such that S < 23(1+K) . This threshold makes the cap binding,
restricting output production in equilibrium such that demand is met in its region of high
demand elasticity (see Sanin and Zanaj, 2011 for details).
3 Equilibria analysis
In this section, we identify the fullled expectations innovation and non-innovation equilib-
ria and in the following subsections we provide some comparative statics to analyze their
characteristics. Through that process, we are able to disentangle innovation incentives as
a function of output market characteristics and regulatory policy constraints. FEE can be
found by imposing, for each case, the expected permits price to be equal to the realized
permits price. Then,
Lemma 1 A non-innovation FEE obtains if and only if F  F0(q0); a partial adoption FEE
obtains if and only if F2(q1)  F  F0(q1) and an innovation FEE obtains if and only if
F  F2(q2), with
F0(q

0) =
(3S+2K 2)(3S 2)(1 K)
9K2
;
F2(q

1) =
(K2 3K+3K2S+2)(3KS K 1)(1 K)
9(K2 K+1)2 ;
F0(q

1) =
(3KS 3K+2K2+1)(3KS K 1)(1 K)
9(K2 K+1)2 ;
F2(q

2) =
(3K2S 2K+2)(3KS 2)(1 K)
9
:
(10)
The previous thresholds on the xed innovation costs are non-linear functions of the
improvement in e¢ ciency K o¤ered by the new technology and of the cap on emissions
S; which together determine the elasticity of output demand at which rms are serving
and would serve the local market after innovation. They determine the values of the pairs
of fS;Kg for which the increase in prots in the output and in the permits market after
6
innovation justify, or not, to cover the xed cost F . Using the above thresholds of xed
costs (10), we build Fig 1 to display the conguration of parameters where the FEE arise.
S
F
Fig 1: Map of FEE equilibria.
The upper dashed curve is the curve of F0(q0) above which FEE non-innovation equilibria
arise; while innovation equilibria arise for relatively small levels of xed costs, i.e., below the
last dashed curve: F  F2(q2): For intermediate levels of xed costs (area between the
two full-line curves) a partial innovation equilibrium arises. These scenarios are result of the
incentives to innovate dictated by the change in market share in the local output market and
by the cost or revenue to buy or sell permits in the global permits market (as we will detail
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2). From Fig 1, it is interesting to notice that the set of parameters
where FEE partial equilibria arise shrinks as the total number of permits issued by the
authority increases. Moreover, for very high S and low xed cost of innovation; the FEE
equilibria with full innovation are also not very likely because the for such high levels of S
the corresponding output receipts for both rms is quite low. For these levels of S and F
it is worth to notice that Cournot equilibria where the expectations of rms about permit
prices are very likely to arise.
The FEE equilibria derived are unique for all relevant values of the pairs fK;Sg since it
is easy to show that F0(q0) > F0(q

1) and F2(q

1) > F2(q

2):Importantly, it also holds that
F2(q

2) < F2(q

1) < F0(q

1) < F0(q

0): (11)
Then, there exists a set of parameters F 2 fF2(q2);F2(q1)g [ fF0(q1);F0(q0)g ; where no
FEE exists. In this set of parameters, the Cournot equilibrium of the production game
exists but these Cournot equilibria are not FEE.9 In these Cournot equilibria the expec-
tations of rms about permit prices are not fullled. In this set, there can be a Cournot
9The existence of a Cournot equilibrium is guarantied by the standard concavity assumptions that our
model satises.
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equilibrium (symmetric or asymmetric) depending on the expectations of rms regarding qe:
An asymmetric Cournot equilibrium arises if one of the rms believes wrongly that q2 (or
q0) will prevail in the global permit market, while the other expects q

1; which is the price
that indeed prevails. The levels of xed costs corresponding to this set are neither low
enough (i.e. F 2 fF2(q2);F2(q1)g ) to induce the correct expectation that an asymmetric
equilibrium will prevail; nor high enough (i.e. F 2 fF0(q1);F0(q0)g) to induce the correct
expectation that a non-innovation equilibrium will prevail at the global permit market. It
is also possible that a non innovation Cournot equilibrium arises if one rm expects q2 to
prevail and the other expects q0 (and none of the rms has incentive to innovate). In any
case, these errors in expectations can be corrected in a learning process if the interaction
among rms is durable10. A more detailed analysis of the nonexistence of FEE is provided
in Appendix B.
3.1 Non-innovation FEE
In this section, we investigate the non-innovation FEE, as stated in Lemma 1. In particular
we study how the policy variable S inuences the threshold F0(q0) (that leads to a non-
innovation FEE when F > F0(q0)):
@F0(q

0)
@S
=
2 (K   2 + 3S) (1 K)
3K2
< 0: (12)
The previous equation shows that, as the cap on local emissions become less binding, i.e.
S increases, incentives to innovate decrease. We can then state the following proposition
Proposition 2 A policy choice that increases the number of permits S, increases the size
of the permit (and consequently the output) market leading to a decrease in the incentives to
invest in clean technologies.
Let us now decompose the di¤erence in prots before and after innovation, in the output
market and the permits market forK ! 2: In Figure 2 and 3 the dashed red curve represents
prots without innovation whereas the dotted green curve represents prots when the rm
is the only one innovating. The thick curve represents the di¤erence between the latter and
the former situation. In Figure 2 we see that, without innovation and in an elastic demand
case, as S (and consequently output production) increases, revenues in the output market
also increase. Instead, when the rm is the only one that implements the clean technology, it
becomes the larger Cournot producer and therefore output revenues become decreasing in S.
Such decrease is due to the provoked decrease in the elasticity of its residual output demand.
Hence, innovation increases output revenues, but such increase is a decreasing function of S.
10In a di¤erent setup dedicated to networks Katz and Shapiro (1985) have similar results. They also dene
equilibria that are FEE and others where the expectations of consumers on the newtwork size is not correct.
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Figure 3 shows the cost in the permits market if the rm is the buyer ( = 1
3
). For
S su¢ ciently low (elastic demand), the price of permits increases after innovation. Then,
the buyers costs are higher after innovation than before (thick line is positive for small S).
Gathering Figure 2 and 3 we see that, in the case of an elastic demand, innovation incentives
in the output market are counterbalanced with the incentives in the permits market for the
buyer of permits since the permitsprice increase after innovation. Instead, it can be easily
shown that incentives to innovate in the permits market are always positive for the seller
(and decreasing with S).
0.40.350.30.25
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
S
O-revenues
Figure 2: Output revenues
0.40.350.30.25
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
-0.05
S
P-revenues
Figure 3: Cost of permits
By xing S; the authority is indirectly capping production which determines the elasticity
of output demand in equilibrium, both with and without innovation. Thus, by xing S the
regulator determines the change in total revenue for each rm. This is also true in the
following subsection.
3.2 Innovation FEE
For an innovation equilibrium to arise the cost of implementation must be lower than the
possible increase in total revenues due to innovation, i.e. F  F2(q2). Figure 4 shows the
di¤erence in output revenues when a rm is innovating as everybody else (red dashed curve)
versus the costs when being the only one not-innovating (increasing green dotted curve).
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Figure 4: Output revenues
The threshold F2(q2) is not a monotonic function of S, in fact, it presents a maximum at
S = (2K 1)
3K2
: This is due to the e¤ect of output demand elasticity. The threshold S = (2K 1)
3K2
measures the e¤ect of innovation on the elasticity of demand at the FEE equilibrium after
innovation. Clearly, the incentives to innovate depend on the change of output demand
elasticity before and after innovation. More precisely,
Proposition 3 When output demand is elastic rms have incentives to use the increased
e¢ ciency achieved by innovation therefore incentives to innovate are positive and increasing,
allowing rms to cover a higher implementation cost F . Instead, when demand is quite elastic
rms still have positive incentives to innovate but incentives are decreasing as elasticity of
output demand decreases.
Pollution control policy covers many sectors (power, steel, aluminium, cement) with very
di¤erent market congurations. While the power sector is well-known for facing an inelastic
demand, other sectors like cement or steel are subject to international competition and
therefore they may face a more elastic demand. Therefore, industries with di¤erent output
markets characteristics will certainly di¤er in their innovation reaction to a pollution control
policy.
4 Concluding Remarks
Previous literature nds that, when the xed cost of implementation is su¢ ciently low,
innovation is always undertaken because it produces a decrease in the unit cost of production
(price of permits)11. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that, when rms are subject to a cap
and trade regulation, innovation may produce an increase in permitsprice that leads to
a higher cost of output production. Herein we have shown that, under these conditions,
11See, for example, Belleamme and Vergari (2011).
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innovation incentives can be negative, even for low xed implementation costs. In particular,
we characterize the way rmsstrength in the output market (symmetric versus asymmetric
Cournot) interacts with rmsposition in the permits market (buyer or seller) to determine
innovation incentives.
From the policy perspective, the allocation of permits between rms determines whether
a certain rm is a buyer or a seller of permits and therefore the incentives that each rm
has in the permits market. Most importantly, the cap on emissions determines both the
incentives in the output market (through its inuence on the availability of input) and on
the permits market (through its inuence on permitsprice).
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Appendix A: Positivity of prots
Herein we show that in the set KS 2  K 1
2K 1 ;
2
3
	
; rmsprots are positive. To do this
we substitute the equilibrium values of permits prices in each the prot functions (6) : It is
straightforward to see that prots corresponding to symmetric outcomes are positive when
the condition of positivity of permits price KS  2
3
is satised. Whereas, as far as concerns
prots of asymmetric Cournot FEE we have
i (1; K; q1)  0 i¤   1
2
( K + 2K2S  KS + 1)2
KS ( K +K2 + 1) ( K + 3KS   1) (13)
This condition always holds because
1
2
( K + 2K2S  KS + 1)2
KS ( K +K2 + 1) ( K + 3KS   1)  0 (14)
since ((3S   1)K   1)  0 due to positivity of permits prices.
Similarly,
j (1; K; q1)  0 if   ((K
2   2K + 1)K + ((( 5K2 + 2K   2)S + 6K   4)K + 2)S)
 2S ( K +K2 + 1) ( K + 3KS   1)
(15)
This condition always holds because
(K3   5K3S2 + 2K2S2 + 6K2S   2K2   2KS2   4KS +K + 2S)
 2S ( K +K2 + 1) ( K + 3KS   1)  1 (16)
and by denition of   1.
Appendix B: Non existence of FEE
Herein we discuss Cournot equilibria that are not FEE. Depending on the expectations of the
rms about the permit price qe; these equilibria can be symmetric or asymmetric. Cournot
equilibria that are not FEE arise in the set F 2 fF2(q2);F2(q1)g [ fF0(q1);F0(q0)g ; which
is not empty since the inequality
F2(q

2) < F2(q

1) < F0(q

1) < F0(q

0): (17)
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holds.
Let us consider di¤erent expectations of rms to see what equilibria may arise in the set
fF2(q2);F2(q1)g : For instance, assume that rm i expects qe = q2; whereas rm j expects
qe = q1:Then, rm i has no incentive to innovate if
i(Ki; Kj; q

2)  i(1; Kj; q2) < F
F2(q

2) < F
while rm j has incentive to innovate in this same interval. Firm j innovates if she believes
that qe = q1 and
j (1; Kj; q

1)  j (1; 1; q1) > F
F2(q

1) > F
Hence, in the set F 2 fF2(q2);F2(q1)g the Cournot equilibrium of the game is an asymmetric
Cournot with rm j innovating and rm i not innovating, but this Cournot equilibrium is
not a FEE.
Similarly, if rm i believes that qe = q0 she has incentive to innovate because
i(Ki; 1; q

0)  i(1; 1; q0) > F
F (q0) > F
while, if at the same time rm j expects qe = q1; she has no incentive to innovate because
j(Ki; 1; q

1)  j(1; 1; q1) < F
F2(q1) < F
Then, in the set F 2 fF0(q1);F0(q0)g ; an asymmetric Cournot that is not a FEE prevails.
Nevertheless, in the same set of parameters, i.e. for F 2 fF2(q2);F2(q1)g ; it is also
possible that a non-innovation equilibrium arises. This equilibrium takes place if both rms
expect qe = q2; but none has incentive to innovate and then
i(Ki; Kj; q

2)  i(1; Kj; q2) < F
F2(q

2) < F
j (Ki; Kj; q

2)  j (1; Kj; q2) < F
F2(q

2) < F
A non innovation symmetric Cournot equilibrium that is not a FEE arises.
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